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1Secret Signals from Another World: Walter Benjamin’s Concept of Innervation
Matthew Charles
Abstract
Walter Benjamin refers to the “idea of revolution as an innervation of the technical organs of the 
collective” as one of the articles of his politics. The significance of this assertion has received 
relatively little attention in the philosophical reception of his political thought compared to the 
alternative model of revolution – made famous from the paralipomena to the late theses ‘On the 
Concept of History’ – as the emergency handbrake of history. Drawing on some of the debates and 
tensions generated by the work of Miriam Bratu Hansen, this discussion aims at an exegesis of some 
of the lesser known intellectual sources that influenced Benjamin’s theory of innervation. The purpose 
in doing so is not an attempt to reconcile or integrate these sources with dominant philosophical 
reconstructions of what is sometimes characterized as Benjamin’s “Western Marxism” and 
elaborated, in the more familiar context of Surrealist innervation, as a synthesis of Freud and Marx, 
but rather to reveal an alternative constellation of Soviet biomechanics and reactionary anti-capitalist 
Lebensphilosophie, united in their shared rejection of Freudian psychoanalysis.  
Contributor’s Note
Matthew Charles is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of English, Linguistics and Cultural Studies, 
University of Westminster. 
In Convolute W of the unfinished Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin refers to the “idea of 
revolution as an innervation [Innervation] of the technical organs of the collective” as one of 
the “articles of my politics.”1 The idea is repeated in material related to the second version 
and the French translation of Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay from 1935/6 but expunged – 
along with the context of first and second technology through which it is explained – from the 
final version, written in the late 1930s.2 The significance of Benjamin’s assertion has 
received relatively little attention in the philosophical reception of his political thought 
I would like to thank my colleague at the Institute for Modern and Contemporary Culture, David Cunningham, and the 
anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on and criticisms of earlier versions of this article. 
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 Benjamin, Arcades Project, W7, 4; hereafter indicated in the text as AP.
2
 Hansen, Cinema and Experience, 133; hereafter indicated in the text as CE; cf. Hansen, “Benjamin and Cinema: Not a 
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2compared to the alternative model of revolution – made famous from the paralipomena to the 
late theses ‘On the Concept of History’ – as the emergency handbrake of history.3 The latter 
tends to equate more straightforwardly, almost tautologically, with the messianic figure of 
interruption with which Benjamin’s thought has become synonymous, although perhaps only 
at the risk of conflating the political and the theological in his work.
Conversely, Benjamin’s more affirmative idea of revolutionary innervations has 
received more attention in film and media theory, primarily in the pioneering work of Miriam 
Bratu Hansen, where it tends to remain isolated within the context of the history of cinema. 
Drawing on some of the debates and tensions generated by Hansen’s work, this discussion 
aims to rectify this omission through an exegesis of some of the lesser known intellectual 
sources that influenced Benjamin’s theory of innervation, and focusing on the theory of 
bodily innervations as well as his extension of this theory into the collective domain of 
technology. The purpose in doing so is not an attempt to reconcile or integrate this account 
with dominant philosophical reconstructions of what is sometimes characterized as 
Benjamin’s Western Marxism,4 but rather to reveal a less familiar and largely repressed set of 
intellectual sources, ranging from Asja Lacis’s proletarian children’s theatre, Vsevolod 
Meyerhold’s biomechanical training, Sergei Eisenstein and Sergei Tretyakov’s theory of 
expressive movements and V. M. Bekhterev’s collective reflexology in the Soviet Union, as 
well as debates about bodily rhythm associated with the reactionary anti-capitalist 
Lebensphilosophie of Rudolf Bode and Ludwig Klages in Germany. What connects these 
theories is a critical rejection of the bourgeois “subjective psychology” of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, problematizing attempts to frame Benjamin’s politics in terms of the 
3
 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 4, 402; hereafter indicated in the text as SW followed by volume and page number.
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 See, for example, Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, 54 & 89-90; Jay, Marxism and Totality, 3. Neil 
Davidson writes that “Western Marxism is the category to which Benjamin’s work has the most obvious affinities, and 
Anderson certainly regards him as one of its representative figures, arguing that Benjamin shares their characteristic 
obscurity of language involving ‘a gnomic brevity and indirection’” (“Walter Benjamin and the classical Marxist tradition”). 
Davidson goes on to question this association, as does, to a certain extent, Esther Leslie in Overpowering Conformism (9-
10).
3synthesis of Marx and Freud typical of Western Marxism. In Benjamin’s work, it will be 
argued, these intervened bodily gestures provide a political model for a utopian will whose 
“secret signal of what is to come” is “not so much a signal of the unconscious, of latent 
processes, repressions, or censorship (as the psychologists like to think), but a signal from 
another world” (SW2 203-6). 
Psychoanalytical Conversions: Contra Freudian-Marxism
Hansen, who offers the most extended and developed discussion of Benjamin’s theory of 
innervation, suggests that the concept emerged with “selective resource to psychoanalysis, 
including the neurological, anthropological, and surrealist fringes of Freud” (CE 134). With 
cautious reservations, her work frames Benjamin’s theory via psychoanalytical models of the 
psychic apparatus, noting how in Freud’s early writing the term describes the normal 
conversion of “an unbearable, incompatible psychic excitation into ‘something somatic’” (CE 
136).5 As she explains, it is most likely a residue of older neurological discourse and is used 
by Freud in a similar sense to mean the transmission of energy along the nerve system, 
specifically the efferent system where it is discharged in the muscular stimulation of organs 
(CE 135). 
In doing so Hansen follows Sigrid Weigel, who argues that Benjamin’s use of this 
term is one of several traces of a “less systematic and conscious, but for all that no less 
intensive reception” of Freud in his earlier work.6 In her brief discussion of the concept, 
Weigel sees it as further evidence of Benjamin’s attempt “at reformulating problems derived 
from Marxism with the aid of a way of looking at things that has been through the school of 
psychoanalysis.” Weigel’s interpretation is situated within the context of Benjamin’s 
reception of Surrealism around 1929, focusing on his the discussion of “bodily collective 
5
 Cf. Freud, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence,” 49.
6
 Weigel, Body- and Image-Space, 107.
4innervation” at the end of ‘The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia’ and of “motoric 
innervation” in his ‘Notes on a Theory of Play’ from the same year.7 In the former, Breton’s 
Nadja is said to “convert” the energies and tensions of intoxication (discovered in the 
shocking, the beloved, the immoral and, most famously, the outmoded) into revolutionary 
experience and action, through a conjunction of bodily innervations and the “the long-sought 
image sphere” which is opened up when politics, stripped of its moral metaphors, becomes 
action that “puts forth its own image” (SW 2: 217). In the ‘First Manifesto of Surrealism,’ 
Breton associates the poetic technique of automatism with the blurring of reality and dream 
into “a kind of absolute reality, a surreality, if one may so speak,” and attributes the 
rediscovery of this realm to Freud.8 As in Margaret Cohen’s Profane Illumination, 
Benjamin’s sought-after interpenetration of body and image is therefore understood, in a 
context determined largely by familiarity with the French avant-garde, as a synthesis of 
Marxism and psychoanalysis.9 
Unlike Weigel, Hansen remains undecided as to “whether Benjamin borrowed the 
term from Freud” and acknowledges that its physiological dimension prevents unproblematic 
translation into Freudian theory (CE 137). Despite these reservations, however, Hansen goes 
on to frame her reading of innervation via psychoanalytical discourse, following Weigel in 
comparing it to Freud and Breuer’s early and more specific description of somatic 
innervation, before contrasting this with Freud’s later account of anticathexis 
(Gegenbesetzung) in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The first concerns the hysteric’s 
7
 Ibid., 111 & 174n17.
8
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the little puppy-dog Sigmund Freud at his heels’ (Aragon, Paris Peasant, 34).
9
 Weigel, Body- and Image-Space, 111; Cohen, Profane Illumination.  
5attempted discharge of the unbearable psychic charge associated with an incompatible idea, 
which, taking “the wrong route,” undergoes a somatic conversion and becomes lodged as a 
mnemonic symbol (the repetitive movements or hallucinations associated with hysterical 
symptoms). This persists, Freud claims, until reconverted into psychic thought-activity and 
then successfully discharged through the process of Beuer’s talking cure (CE 135-6).10 
Hansen contrasts this with the distinct description of anticathexis offered by Freud as 
a reaction to the repetition-compulsion (the death drive’s compulsion to repeat, demonstrated 
by victims of traumatic shock following the First World War) in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, which Benjamin makes reference to in his most sustained engagement with Freud 
in the late essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’. Whereas innervation attempts the discharge 
of excitation (but takes the “wrong route” in hysteria), anticathexis is, in contrast, the 
investment of another kind of energy by the ego to bind and control the mass of excitations 
associated with a traumatic breach in perceptual consciousness, an investment that takes 
place at the expense of an impoverishment of the rest of the psychic system. As Hansen 
notes, “the term innervation does not appear in this context, and for good reason, because it 
refers to the very process that is blocked ...the kind of discharge that alone could undo and 
counteract the anaesthetizing effects pinpointed by Benjamin” (CE 136). 
Having established this Freudian framework, Hansen positions Benjamin’s expanded 
concept of innervation as an alternative both to the therapeutic re-conversion and discharge of 
neurotic somatic traces and to the adaptive but impoverishing reaction to machinic shock 
offered by psychoanalysis. Drawing on and developing Susan Buck-Morss’s interpretation in 
The Dialectics of Seeing, Hansen defines Benjamin’s innervation as a “two-way process or 
transfer, that is, not only a conversion of mental, affective energy into somatic, motoric form 
but also the possibility of reconverting, and recovering, split-off psychic energy through 
10
 Freud, “The Neuro-Psychosis of Defence,” 349; cf. Weigel, Body- and Image-Space, 9.
6motoric stimulation” that takes place via “a mimetic reception of the external world” (CE 
150). In doing so, Hansen expands the role of the sensorially blasted cortical layer of 
“perceptual consciousness” beyond its function as a protective shield in Freud’s later account 
to that of a two-way matrix or medium of interplay between inner and outer, psychic and 
somatic. This positive, mimetic therapy constitutes an “empowering ...active response” to 
technological experience in contrast to a negative, passive and “defensive mimetic adaptation 
that protects at the price of paralyzing”. In particular, Miriam Hansen declares herself 
“sceptical” of attempts, especially by Mark Hansen in Embodying Technesis, to “assimilate 
Benjamin’s speculations to contemporary media theory …and the subject’s inevitable 
abdication to the a priori regime of the apparatus” (CE 146 & n48). Both identify “the 
alignment of innervation with image content” as “the hallmark of Benjamin’s [earlier] 
surrealist phase” and regard this as “irreconcilable” with the concept of technological shock 
developed in Benjamin’s later essay ‘On Some Motifs in Baudelaire’, although they differ in 
their respective privileging of these accounts.11 
Leaving to one side the accuracy of Hansen’s account of innervation, it should be 
noted that there are a number of problems connected to the interpretative framework used to 
develop this, problems that relate to a more general tension generated by psychoanalytical 
contextualisations of Benjamin’s theory. Whilst Weigel, for example, argues that “the older, 
neurological variant of psychoanalysis, in which bodily processes were attributed greater 
significance, evidently played a role in Benjamin’s earliest studies of Freud” (Benjamin 
attended Paul Häberlein’s seminar on Freud whilst at Bern in 1918), she fails to acknowledge 
that Benjamin is generally critical of Freud in these early writings, where he has a tendency 
to side with the madness of the analysand rather than the rationalism of the analyst and to 
11
 Hansen, Embodying Technesis, 237-8.
7identify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with the religious structure of Schuld (guilt/debt) 
that underpins capitalist modernity (SW1 288-291).12
Although references to psychoanalysis proliferate in his work from 1930 onwards, the 
notion of the ‘collective unconscious’, elaborated alongside that of ‘collective bodily 
innervations’ in the Arcades Project, is closer to the depth psychology of C. G. Jung than 
Freud, as Adorno worriedly cautions (SW3 56). Indeed, this theory of dreams proceeds on the 
assumption of a “extravagantly heightened inner awareness” in the sleeper’s dream-
consciousness to “his own body, and the noises and feelings of his insides, such as blood 
pressure, intestinal churn, heartbeat, and muscle sensation” (AP K1, 4), which has more in 
common with pre-Freudian, physiological accounts of dreaming. As John McCole has 
concluded, Benjamin’s “understanding of the temporal relationship between dreams and 
waking ...separates him fundamentally from the founder of psychoanalysis.”13 Even in ‘On 
Some Motifs’, which represents one of his most sustained positive engagements with 
psychoanalysis, Benjamin has to practice what has been called a “strong misreading” of 
Freud in order to draw his Proustian distinction between two kinds of memory (Erinnerung 
and Gedächtnis) and so rescue a non-conservative and dynamic account of remembrance 
(Eingedenken).14 
Given her attempt to construct a positive therapeutic account of innervation in earlier 
versions of the ‘Work of Art’ essay, in contrast to the negative adaptation to technological 
shock she finds in Benjamin’s last writings, it is therefore odd that Hansen proceeds from a 
Freudian framework that only becomes adopted in those later writings. For in projecting that 
schema back into the earlier writings, she can give no explanation as to why Benjamin would 
seek to construct an alternative model of therapeutic discharge over and against Freud’s 
12
 Weigel, Body- and Image-Space, 111 & 106. Scholem notes that “Schreber’s book appealed to him far more than Freud’s 
essay on it” (Scholem, Walter Benjamin, 57; quoted in Sarah Ley Roff, “Benjamin and Psychoanalysis,” 119). Cf. 
Hamacher, “Guilt History,” 98.
13
 McCole, Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition, 294-5.
14
 Hansen, Embodying Technesis, 234.
8privileging of the talking cure as the privileged process of re-conversion and discharge, nor 
why it is when he does turn more explicitly to Freud that the therapeutic element of 
innervation is dropped. 
Although the concept of innervation resurfaces in the 1929 essay on Surrealism, it is 
therefore unsurprising that the term precedes this work, nor that it is absent from his earlier 
essay on Surrealism, ‘Dream Kitsch’, written in 1925. As Hansen and Weigel make clear, it 
first enters his writing in relation to the new “cycle of production” that is inaugurated with 
One-Way Street (written 1923-6; published 1928). Nor is it surprising that Hansen is 
compelled to admit that, “imagined as a two-way process, Benjamin’s concept of innervation 
may have less in common with Freudian psychoanalysis than with contemporary perceptual 
and behaviourist psychology, physiological aesthetics, and acting theory, in particular the 
Soviet avant-garde discourse of biomechanics” (CE 140). Like Susan Buck-Morss, who 
similarly notes how Benjamin’s “theories of mimesis and innervation ...resonate intriguingly 
with discussions of biorhythmics and biomechanics among Soviet theatre and film directors 
like Meyerhold and Eisenstein,”15 Hansen does not develop her insight beyond a few lines, 
relegating most of her discussion to the footnotes and apologetically reflecting that “recourse 
to neurophysiological and reflex psychology may not be as sophisticated as the insights of 
psychoanalysis” (CE 137). 
Yet it is possible that an appeal to sophistication is itself a consequence of the current 
dominance of psychoanalytical theory within Western culture, Western Marxism and the 
contemporary fields of literary, cultural and media theory to which these contributed. If this is 
the case, one danger of such translation is that we bring Benjamin’s thought into the 
familiarity of our intellectual present – including that of the European avant-garde – too 
15
 Buck-Morss, “Walter Benjamin: Between Academic Fashion and the Avant-Garde,” 79.
9seamlessly, jettisoning the friction and tension that may be produced in striking the 
underground currents of what is now unfashionable or derided. 
 
From Repression to Expression: Biomechanical Release
In both the Arcades Project, begun in the late 1920s, and its near-identical formulation in the 
‘Work of Art’ essay from the mid-1930s, Benjamin compares the collective “efforts at 
innervation” on the part of the technological body with how “a child who has learned to grasp 
stretches out its hand for the moon as it would a ball” (SW2 124, n10). It is this figure of the 
bodily gestures of the learning child that directly connects the first appearance of the term 
innervation in One-Way Street with its resurfacing at the end of the decade, not in the essay 
on Surrealism but in the ‘Programme for a Proletarian Children’s Theatre’. Benjamin had 
promised to formulate these “theoretical foundations” after expressing “tremendous interest” 
in Asja Lacis’s children’s theatre when they first met in 1924, but he only completed them 
after they were reunited in Berlin, following his trip to Moscow, sometime in 1928-9.16 
As Justine McGill has argued, dominant interpretations of Benjamin’s life and work 
typically overlook how the shared fascination for theatre drew Benjamin and Lacis into a 
productive intellectual, as well as erotic, relationship.17 The proletarian theatres upon which 
Benjamin and Lacis’s ‘Programme’ is based, established by Lacis in Orel in 1918, in Riga 
and Moscow in the early 1920s and then attempted unsuccessfully in Berlin in 1929, 
performed plays by, among others, the avant-garde director and producer Meyerhold, who 
Lacis had first encountered during her studies at the Bekhterev Institute in St. Petersburg, and 
performances would likely have been modelled on the biomechanical techniques of 
16
 McGill, “The Porous Coupling of Walter Benjamin and Asja Lacis,” 62.
17
 Ibid., 59.    
10
Meyerhold, Eisenstein and Tretyakov that Lacis would have experienced whilst attending the 
Fyodor Komisarjevsky theatre studio in Moscow.18 
Eisenstein and Tretyakov claimed, in their 1923 essay on ‘Expressive Movement,’ that 
their biomechanical theatre training was rooted in a theory of “expressive movement,” which 
divided all gestures into “subconscious, instinctive, the pure biological” reflexes (such as the 
internal bodily movements associated with breathing, digestion and the heartbeat, and the 
involuntary muscular responses to bodily stimulus, such as the grasping and startle reflexes 
found in infants) and “the conscious, controlled, co-ordinated, and restrained” movements.19 
For the actor, Eisenstein and Tretyakov write, “Expression is always a motor element …a 
process…and ...from the very mechanics of this process, one can single out the moment of 
‘fixation’ – the moment when the forces are balanced, after which the expression passes over 
either into a real act, symbolized by the expression (victory of the reflexive thrust), or into a 
state of repose (victory of the voluntary stimulus).” The “fixation” of the expression of 
grasping, for example, symbolized by the crooked fingers of the hand, can lead either to the 
completion of the reflex of grasping or to the conscious relaxation of the fingers. 
When reflexes and conscious movement come into conflict, false “tensions” may be 
produced that can cause muscle fatigue, cramps and temporary paralysis, as well as the 
possibility that “the voluntary impulse and nervous expenditure turn inward, so to speak, 
disorganizing the reflexive apparatus.”20 Biomechanical training is intended to overcome 
such psychophysical tensions through the practice of “releasing” exercises, which provide the 
basis of the biomechanical “postures” used in actor training, directed “toward elimination of 
false tensions”.21 
18
 Lacis, Revolutionär im Beruf, 12-14; McGill, “The Porous Coupling of Walter Benjamin and Asja Lacis,” 59-60.
19






The dualistic structure of Benjamin and Lacis’s ‘Program,’ which is organized into a 
Schema of Tension and Release (Spannung/Erlösung, the latter translated less 
physiologically in the Selected Writings as “Resolution”), derives, I want to suggest, from 
this biomechanical theory, which therefore provides a more direct starting point for the two-
way concept of innervation that Hansen seeks in psychoanalysis. In the ‘Program,’ Benjamin 
characterizes the gestures of the child as an exactly balanced transference between the 
“receptive innervation” of the perceptual organs and the “creative innervation” of the motor 
organs, and describes the workshops of the theatre schools as aiming at the “development of 
these gestures in the different forms of expression” (SW2 203). The theatrical performances, 
which collectively combine these different forms, enable the tensions [Spannungen] of this 
collective labour to be released [lösen] in a manner that becomes educational for both the 
child performers and the adult audience, since such a performance also “unleashes vast 
energies for the true genius of education – namely, the power of observation.” For Lacis, 
theatrical training could therefore provide the means “which would completely take hold” of 
the war orphans she encountered “and set their traumatized abilities free.”22
Significantly, Eisenstein went on to develop these biomechanical techniques, in the 
context first of theatre in ‘The Montage of Attractions’ (1923) and then of cinema in ‘The 
Montage of Film Attractions’ (1924), into his own theory of the training of collective reflexes 
through expressive movements, for which Hansen observes, he repeatedly uses the term 
innervation (CE 324, n22). As Lutz Koepnick acknowledges, “Although Benjamin never 
discusses particular Russian avant-garde film in further detail, his understanding of cinematic 
communication as a process of shock, disruption, and spectatorial stimulation clearly draws 
from Eisenstein’s early notions of montage cinema.”23 Eisenstein’s description of his early 
method as the “free montage of arbitrarily selected independents effects (attractions),” with 
22
 Lacis, “A Memoir,” 25; quoted in McGill, “The Porous Coupling of Walter Benjamin and Asja Lacis,” 62.
23
 Koepnick, Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power, 132.
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the latter defined as the calculated use of “any element of the theatre that subjects the 
spectator to a sensual or psychological impact …to produce in him certain emotional shocks,” 
will be familiar, for example, to readers of Benjamin’s ‘Work of Art’ essay.24 For Benjamin, 
the discontinuity of cinematic images dissects expressive bodily gestures into a series of 
minute innervations, while the continuity of the sequence of images in a filmstrip replicates 
that of the assembly line within the industrial production process (SW2 94-5). The shock 
effect produced by this continuous discontinuity inculcates the more tactile experience of 
reception in distraction around which the ‘Work of Art’ essay is centred (SW2 117-120). As 
for Eisenstein, who singles out the “lyrical effect” of Charlie Chaplin’s films as “inseparable 
from the attraction of the specific mechanics of his movements,”25 it is Chaplin’s slapstick 
sequences that take on particular historical significance for Benjamin, within the context of a 
“therapeutic release of unconscious energies” that have arisen from the “dangerous tensions” 
produced by technology: Chaplin’s Gestus, his “jerky sequence of tiny movements,” thus 
integrates “the human being into the film image” (SW2 117-120).   
Mimetic Attraction: Collective Reflexology
While there has been widespread acknowledgement of the influence of avant-garde practices 
of montage in Benjamin’s writing from One-Way Street onwards, less attention has been paid 
to its associated theory of psychosomatic or affective attractions and the biomechanical 
principles of bodily expressive rhythm upon which these are based. It is important to 
recognize, for example, that according to Eisenstein, 
the attractionness of an expressive movement (that is, the psycho-physical, 
previously-calculated effect on the spectator) is assured ...to the extent that each 
24
 Eisenstein, “Montage of Attractions,” 34. 
25
 Ibid., cf. also Yutkevich and Eisenstein, “The Eighth Art. On Expressionism, America and, of course, Chaplin”. 
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phase of ...work attracts the attention of the spectator [through] …the arousal of 
the intended emotions in the spectator ...who in turn reflexively repeated in the 
weakened form the entire system of the actor’s movements: as a result of the 
produced movements, the spectator’s incipient muscular tensions are released in 
the desired emotion.26 
The politically directed organization of the actors’ movements is designed to produce a 
corresponding psychosomatic “agitation” or “the moulding of the audience in a desire 
direction (or mood).”27 A “purely productive tension” in the performer’s movements 
generates an emotion in the spectator which “grows and develops at the expense of the[ir] 
unused muscular energy,” until the point it is eventually collectively discharged. The 
attraction is, in this sense, a posture staged as a releasing exercise for the audience. The 
overall combination of such postures is designated as a “montage of attractions,” the latter 
defined as “any demonstrable fact (an action, an object, a phenomenon, a conscious 
combination, and so on) that is known and proven to have a definite effect on the attention 
and emotions of the audience.”28 
Eisenstein later articulates such ‘A Dialectic Approach to Film Form’ (1929) in terms 
that broadly correspond to the first two principles of Friedrich Engel’s Dialectics of Nature, 
which Eisenstein first read in 1926: the interpenetration of opposites in conflict, or rhythmic 
tensions, and the quantitative change in energy that results in qualitative transformation, or 
dynamic expression.29 In his earlier writings, however, they are more directly linked to 
Meyerhold and, through Meyerhold, to the neurologist Bekhterev. In a list of topics for a 
programme of study associated with Meyerhold’s biomechanical training, the second is on 
“the nature of expressive movements and actions determined by the biological construction of 
26
 Eisenstein and Tretyakov, “Expressive Movement,” 187.
27
 Eisenstein, “The Montage of Attractions,” 34.
28
 Eisenstein, “The Montage of Attractions,” 35; Eisenstein, “The Montage of Film Attractions,” 40-1.
29
 Eisenstein, “A Dialectic Approach to Film Form,” 47; Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 30; cf. Bulgakowa, Sergei Eisenstein: 
A Biography.
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the organism” and includes, “Mimeticism and its biological significance (Bekhterev).”30 
Here, the biomechanical model of psychophysical “tension” and “release” acquires a 
collective dimension through the notion of an “imitative, mimical infectiousness” upon the 
audience.
Bekhterev’s reflexology explicitly eschewed the “subjective psychology” of Western 
bourgeois societies, drawing instead on an “objective psychology” that investigated the 
system of innate (or unconditional) and association (or conditional) reflexes acquired through 
experience. He proposed that expressive movements could be understood as somato-mimetic 
reflexes: innate reflex responses to specific stimuli, such as the physiological reactions to 
irritants characterized by laughter or weeping, that could become conditioned as responses to 
non-physical stimuli, and that functioned as a mimetic language: a physical expression of 
physiological-emotional conditions often non-consciously imitated and so experienced by 
other observers.31 Extending this investigation beyond the scope of the individual, 
Bekhterev’s Suggestion and Its Role in Social Life (1908) and Collective Reflexology (1921) 
sought to investigate the “psychical” elements that holds between individuals in social groups 
and brings human collectives as a composite personality into existence. At the heart of such 
collectives is the ability to imitate, already present in a new born infant’s reflexive ability to 
copy the sounds, gestures, and movements of her mother, but also present in somato-mimetic 
reflexes such as emotion, and involved in the transmission of collective movement over large 
distances in space and time, such as the spread of revolutions or the revival of historical 
fashions in the present.32 
30
 A further subject, headed “Mimeticism,” lists the following topics: “Study by the actor of muscle movements,” 
“Movement of torso, arms, legs, head,” “Rationalization of movements,” “Signs of Recoil,” “Tempos of movements,” 
“Legato, staccato,” “Gesture as a result of movement”, “Large and small gesture,” “Laws of coordination of the body” (Law 
and Gordon, Meyerhold, Eisenstein and Biomechanics,126-8).
31
 Bekhterev, General Principles of Human Reflexology, 237-241; Bekhterev, “Emotions as Somato-Mimetic Reflexes,” 
270-283.
32
 Bekhterev, Collective Reflexology, 118-9.
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For Bekhterev, the “psychic contagion” associated with “unintentional imitation” in 
groups interweaves closely with the phenomenon of suggestion, “the direct induction of 
psychic states,” including ideas, feelings, and sensations, “from one person to another 
…without participation of the will (attention) of the perceiving person and often even without 
clear understanding on his part.”33 Bekhterev discusses such collective suggestion in relation 
to examples of the ideo-motor reflex known as Carpenter’s Effect.34 Alongside reflexes such 
as swallowing or blinking in response to a stimulus, the physiologist William Carpenter 
coined the term ideo-motor reflex to characterize how, under certain conditions of heightened 
suggestibility, “Ideas may become the source of muscular movement, independently either of 
volitions or of emotions.”35 More generally, as Bekhertev’s reference to such phenomena 
indicates, the Carpenter Effect characterizes our tendency to unconsciously mimic the 
movements and implicitly the emotional state of a person we are observing, famous most 
notoriously in apparently spiritualist and paranormal phenomena such as dowsing, table 
turning, Ouija boards and telepathy. 
As Hansen points out, Benjamin’s interest in innervation was similarly preoccupied 
with “the notion of a physiological ‘contagious’ or ‘infectious’ movement that would trigger 
emotional effects in the viewer, a form of mimetic identification based on the phenomena 
then known as Carpenter’s Effect” (CE 137). Carpenter and others attributed such effects to 
the interruption of the “ordinary upward course of external impressions, – whereby they 
successively produce sensations, ideas, emotions, and intellectual processes, the will giving 
the final decision upon the action to which they prompt,” an interruption of intellectual and 
volitional processes that can occur during a state of highly focused attention expectant of a 
given result and results in a transversal movement of energy towards an automated motor 
33
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34
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 Carpenter, “On the influence of Suggestion in Modifying and directing Muscular Movement, independently of Volition,” 
152.
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impulse. However, Benjamin’s interest in innervation, as Hansen makes clear, was 
preoccupied with the opposite kind of movement: the possibility of a motoric-ideation reflex, 
in which mimetic stimulation of the sensory or locomotor organs, outside of the conscious 
intellectual processes such as in receptive states of distraction, might activate a deeper layer 
of ideas that, combined with present perceptions, could form the basis of an alternative object 
for the will.
Against Neil Leach’s claim that “Mimesis in Walter Benjamin’s writing, as indeed in 
Adorno’s work, is a psychoanalytic term – taken from Freud,” this suggests an alternative 
context for Benjamin’s account of mimesis in ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ and ‘On the Mimetic 
Faculty’ from the early 1930s.36 While Benjamin’s writing on the mimetic faculty returns to 
an earlier linguistic interest in the dissolution of the dichotomy of subject and object, in his 
later writings the deduction of an experience of non-sensuous similitude is ultimately founded 
on a physiological account of “spontaneous mimic-expressive gestures,” distinguished from 
but related to both spoken language and conceptual thought (SW3 83-4).37 For the early 
Benjamin, “[w]e cannot imagine anything [either animate or inanimate nature] that does not 
communicate its mental nature in its expression,” such that the “language of this lamp, for 
example, communicates not the lamp …but the language-lamp, the lamp in communication, 
the lamp in expression” (SW1 62-3). This expressiveness of the lamp returns in Benjamin’s 
later writing, in the context of the childhood acquisition of language, as a residue of the 
“now-vanished ability to become similar,” where, via these “formative powers [Bildekräfte],” 
the objects that surround the child in youth, “chairs, stairwells, cupboards, net curtains, and 
36
 Neil Leach, “Mimesis,” 94.
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 It is important to note, however, that Benjamin’s discussion of such gestures draws on the research of Lev Vygotsky, 
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even a lamp,” are formed into the imaginative content of adulthood (SW2 685 & 691-2). The 
powers that later underlie language are at first directed, Benjamin writes, toward “the most 
distant things in the deepest, most unconscious stratum of its own existence” and associated 
with the mimetic activity of play, in which a series of primal gestures enable the child to 
experiment with and master the basic rhythms of their own bodily nature in a way that 
transforms shattering experiences into habit (SW2 115-6). Children’s imitative play is 
therefore understood as constituting a form of physiological training in this archaic mimetic 
faculty, a faculty which, as we shall see, is regarded as undergoing a fundamental historical 
transformation whose cosmic implications are described by Benjamin in One-Way Street.   
Expressive Movement and Formative Power: Left-Wing Klageseanism
Although the influence of the Soviet biomechanics of Meyerhold, Eisenstein and Tretyakov, 
and Lacis, grounded in the objective psychology of Bekhterev, appears to coincide and 
corroborate Benjamin’s political turn to Marxism in mid-1920s, the remainder of this article 
will argue that these ideas represent the working through of his own previous political 
commitments, and should be seen less as a “break” in his work than the articulation of an 
anthropological materialism Benjamin had been developing since his rupture with mentor 
Gustav Wyneken in 1915. In other words, what Benjamin discovered, in the radically 
transformed social context of post-revolutionary Russia, was a technologically affirmative 
and non-individualist updating of Lebensphilosophie debates about bodily rhythm that 
Benjamin was already familiar with and fascinated by from his earlier involvement in the 
Youth Movement.
While Eisenstein’s later notion of filmic conflict is formulated in terms of an 
Engelsian-Marxian dialectic, it nonetheless “resonated with the vitalist models of rhythm so 
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important for the early 20th century’s understanding of the body.”38 Indeed, as Robert Leach 
points out, “the direct physical base upon which Tretyakov and Eisenstein built their system 
of Expressive Movement” was Rudolf Bode’s Rhythm and its Meaning for Bodily Education 
(1920) and Expressive Gymnastics (1922), which they translated and adapted.39 Bode claimed 
in turn that his theory of expressive movement explicitly developed “the line of thought 
found in [the cosmic vitalism of Ludwig] Klages’s work,” in which “the science of rhythm 
has taken a decisive step forward,” departing from contemporary psychology’s rationalistic 
attempt to define rhythm conceptual, and in response to Bodes’s endorsement Klages 
developed these ideas further in his 1923 essay on The Nature of Rhythm, written for the 
Convention for Artistic Bodily Schooling in Berlin.40 Eisenstein recognized the 
correspondence between Bodes’s and Klages’s accounts of the “conflict between conditioned 
and unconditioned reflexes,” while criticizing the latter for treating expressive movements in 
an insufficiently dialectical manner.41 It was, nonetheless, in Klages’s work that Eisenstein 
first “found reference to the Carpenter Effect,” Bulgakowa argues, and so confirmation of his 
aesthetic interest in the mimetic infectiousness of attractions.42 
In Spirit [Geist] as Adversary of the Soul [Seele] (1929-32), Klages insists on the 
thesis which “has guided all our enquiries for the past three decades or so: that body [Leib] 
and Seele are inseparably connected poles of the unity of life into which Geist inserts itself 
from the outside like a wedge, in an effort to set them apart from each other, that is, to de-
soul the body [den Leib zu entseelen] and disembody the soul [die Seele zu entleiben], and so 
finally to smother any life which it can attain.”43 Geist, in contrast, is regarded as an 
“acosmic” irruption into the natural unity of human life, one “whose essence is will, the 
38
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enemy and the slayer of life” (SC 182-3). Klages therefore claimed that “excessive rationality 
or intellectual analysis,” identified with Geist, “was a source of ‘arhythm,’ or unnatural, 
strained, discordant, stifled movement.”  Klages contrasts the mechanized and rationalized 
Takt of industrial modernity with the Rhythmus of natural reflexes (such as breathing, 
heartbeat but also the rhythmic movement of tides and planets), associating the latter with a 
theory of expressive movement [Ausdrucksbewegung] first developed in Expressive 
Movement and Formative Power in 1913 and incorporated into later editions of his Science of 
Character (originally published in 1910). Klages’s metaphysical distinction between the 
arrhythmic repetitions of a rationalized Geist and the rhythmic reflexes of the unified Leib 
and Seele broadly corresponds, Eisenstein asserted, to Bode’s description of the “conflict 
between conditioned and unconditioned reflexes” that grounded the biomechanical exercises 
discussed. 
Benjamin had been introduced to Klages’s ideas through his involvement in the 
Anfang wing of the German Youth Movement, associated with educational reformer Gustav 
Wyneken, and attended the first congress of the movement on Mount Meissner in 1913, to 
which Klages had been invited to compose an address.44 The subsequently published address 
(Klages was unable to deliver it in person), Man and Earth, was, Klages later writes, a 
“terrible analysis of the rape of nature by humanity in the present day ...[that] sought to prove 
that man, as the bearer of Geist, has torn himself apart along with the planet which gave him 
birth.”45 The year after the congress, Klages gave a lecture to the Free German Students at 
Benjamin’s invitation; the latter’s work, following his break from Wyneken in 1915 over the 
latter’s support for the war, which both Benjamin and Klages bitterly opposed, increasingly 
44
 See Benjamin’s pseudonymously published “Youth was Silent” (1913) for a report on the congress and denunciation of 
the anti-Semitism and chauvinism of elements of the Youth Movement present. Although these elements are present in 
Klages’s work, they are largely absent from Man and Earth, which denounces in more general terms the problematic Spirit 
manifested in Christianity and capitalist modernity. 
45
 Klages, ‘Vorwort für die Zeitgenossen,’ Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele, Zweite Auflage; translated in Schnädelbach, 
Philosophy in Germany. 1831-1933,150.
20
took on aspects of the pessimistic outlook and conceptual terminology of Klages’s thought.46 
In an exchange from 1920, Benjamin praised Klages’s theory of dream consciousness 
(published in 1914 and expanded in 1919), writing that it had “revealed to me extraordinary 
and, if I may say so, longed-for perspectives”; as Nitzan Lebovic observes, Klages’s 
“response, still unpublished, mentioned other pieces he had written and included an invitation 
to meet in Berlin the following spring.”47 In a 1923 letter Benjamin further conveys his 
enthusiasm for the ideas Klages presented in Vom kosmogensichen Eros, excerpts of which 
appeared alongside an introduction by Sigfried Kracauer on Klages’s theory of primal images 
in the Frankfurt Zeitung in June 1922.48 
Richard Wolin has gone as far as to suggest that this “dangerous encounter” with 
Klages is the “defining moment of his intellectual trajectory …key to understanding 
Benjamin’s development.”49 Werner Fuld and Nitzan Lebovic both argue that this interest in 
Klages is grounded in a shared rejection of Freudian psychology, and, in her discussion of 
Benjamin’s concept of the aura, Hansen similarly notes that Klages’s “implicitly anti-
Freudian treatise appealed to Benjamin’s interest in eccentric states of consciousness” 
because of its “emphasis on the phenomenal-sensorial characteristics of dreaming, rather than 
46
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the meaning and interpretation of dreams”.50 More specifically, John McCole has suggested 
that Benjamin’s 1929 essay on Surrealism, in which the innervating interpenetration of 
image-space and body-space is explored, was in reality “directed at a figure behind Aragon 
…Ludwig Klages.”51
Although the work of Klages is replete with anti-Semitism and modelled on a 
reactionary anti-capitalism that was adopted with ease by the Right (although eventually 
rejected by Nazi authorities), its surprising influence on both Benjamin and Eisenstein opens 
up intriguing points of continuity which helps explain the resonance of the Soviet avant-garde 
for him. Despite Eisenstein’s criticism of aspects of Klages’s theory of expressive movement, 
what the latter does introduce into debates about bodily innervation is a metaphysical account 
of the image, one that was already influential on Benjamin’s thought in the 1920s and came 
to inform his later concept of the aura, and in relation to which Eisenstein’s montage of film 
attractions may be said to be a dialectical and materialist revisioning, in line with Benjamin’s 
own political thought. 
According to Klages, the capacity for rhythmic movement is grounded in a drive 
[Trieb] to expression identified with a creative or formative force [Gestaltungskraft] inherent 
to all living organisms and connected both to basic motility (the body’s capacity for self-
motion) and to formativeness (the capacity for shaping of forms). What is distinctive about 
Klages’s vitalism is the connection of this instinctive drive with a theory of primal images 
[Urbilden], derived from the natural philosophy of Goethe.52 These vital images are present 
even in the most basic germ-cell, Klages claims, since “in the fertilized cell there acts, as 
moulding power, the image of the growing body,” such that “the process of growth and 
50
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ripening (which is certainly profoundly unconscious) take[s] place by virtue of the power of 
images.”53 This drive to formative expression is, in later editions, explicitly contrasted with 
the psychic model Freud advanced, beginning with revisions made to the third edition of The 
Interpretation of Dreams in 1911 (in response to criticism by Jung) and developed, in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, into the hypotheses of the biological presence of a death drive and 
account of primary narcissism, which are central to the diagnosis of modern society in 
Civilization and Its Discontents. The “popular view,” equated with “so-called 
psychoanalysis” (‘so-called’ because, according to Klages, it analyses not the psyche or soul 
[Seele] but the spirit [Geist]) “goes widely wrong when it seeks the key to the hysterical 
formation of life in the violence of the repugnance from which the self-esteem of the patient 
can save itself only by the ‘repression’ from consciousness of the events which cause it 
shame and disgust” (SC 179 & 289n37). Where psychoanalysis posits too little consciousness 
– the repression of censored desires into the unconscious is to be resolved by conscious 
working through – Klages attributes hysteria to too much, at the expense of psychosomatic 
expression in feelings and impulse. 
In more complex organisms such as animals and humans, these urges or drives 
compel the organism to bodily movement through “the unconscious presence of the attractive 
power of the image which promises satisfaction.” It is this “attraction of vital magnetism” 
that connects the thirsty horse or hungry cow and the image of water or grass. The 
“impression is not the attraction,” however, “but only stimulates it”: the image, with its 
capacity for vital action, can operate without, and must be distinguished from, conscious 
perception, imagination and recollection that Klages associates not with the embodied Seele 
but rather with the intruding Geist (SC 172; 175-6). Images, in contrast, are experienced by 
humans as the “element of mood which is part of every human feeling,” one which “testifies 
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to the connection (now close, now loose) between the Seele and the actuality of images” (SC 
172-3).The intrusion of Geist leaves us “weak in images,” such that “the capacity for 
movement has grown at the expense of the capacity for formation” (SC 180). 
The capacity for expression becomes impoverished to the extent that only the willed 
impulse to bodily motion remains, no longer associated with the expression of natural 
Rhythmus but instead governed by rationalized Takt. Under such conditions, if 
the lack of capacity for spontaneous expression is accompanied by a powerful 
desire after expression, a conflict would arise which would be unendurable in the 
long run, and especially would prove destructive of the self-esteem of the person 
in question, were it not that the troubled organism found a substitute in an 
impulse (of progressively increasing independence) towards representation of 
states of feeling (SC 169).
Self-esteem is therefore preserved in such instances through the substitution of expressive 
movement with the mere representation of feelings: the vitality of feelings becomes 
increasingly atrophied (devoid of the image-content of mood), the impulses of the body are 
made subservient to a non-formative will (motility without formative expression), and 
imagination becomes increasingly susceptible to externally-influenced illusions. The “graver 
forms” of such substitution are characteristic of the “hysterical character” (SC 173-4).54 
Klages maintains, however, that in the natural state of organisms (such as a healthy 
human child) there is equilibrium between the capacity for and urge towards expression, that 
is, between bodily motion and the processes he names the image-creating capacity of life. 
This equilibrium is still occasionally experienced in those moments of profound rapture or 
intoxication Klages expands upon in the two parts of his On Dream Consciousness (1914 and 
54
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1919) and On Cosmogonic Eros (1922). The “elemental or cosmic” force of Eros, whose 
primordial form of consciousness is hinted at in the “night consciousness” of our dreams, 
“transforms all events that separates bodies [die Körper] ...into the omnipresent element of an 
embracing and encompassing ocean.”55 It is also experienced as Rausch, the rush of cosmic 
intoxication or ecstasy, in which the separation of the subject and object is dissolved and the 
fixed coordinates of “here/there” and “now/then” are replaced by a “perpetual present with a 
boundlessly mobile now-point” and a “boundlessly mobile ‘here’.”56 In dreams and 
intoxication it is “the Eros of the distance, which releases us from the tangible world of 
things, and transports us to the ungraspable actuality of images [betastende Wirklichkeit der 
Bilder]!”57 Such experiences accord with Klages ‘pagan’ conception of time, which “in 
complete opposition to logical consciousness, which – feeling its way along the straight line 
of time – considers each past thing to be destroyed, but in the present sees only repetitions of 
it, the Pelasgians – bound up with the circle of time – live, know, and teach the eternal return 
of the origin [ewige Wiederbringung des Ursprungs].”58
Although it is possible that Benjamin’s 1921 fragment ‘Capitalism as Religion’ – with 
its critical discussions of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx – may already have been influenced by 
Klages’s similar condemnation of capitalism as the religious consummation of Christianity, it 
is in the ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem’ from 1922-3 and One-Way Street begun in 
1924 that Benjamin begins most noticeably to reference the Klagesean concepts of cosmic 
experience, ecstatic trance, an erotics of nearness and distance, and planetary destruction by 
the Geist of technology as part of his own construction of an escape route from the bitter 
nihilism of the latter’s prophecies about modernity. The tour of German inflation represented 
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in One-Way Street’s ‘Imperial Panorama,’ for example, proclaims that “mass instincts have 
become confused and estranged from life,” producing a “perversion of vital instincts” (SW 
1:451), while the concluding visit ‘To the Planetarium’ singles out the “dangerous error of 
modern humanity” as the devaluation of our communal cosmic experience [kosmische 
Erfahrung] – achieved by the ancients through ecstatic trance [Rausch] in which we are 
assured “what is nearest to us and what is remotest from us” – to individual, poetic 
enthusiasm [Schwärmerei] (SW 1:486-7). As a result of this, a “new and unprecedented 
marriage with the cosmic powers” erupts in an uncontrollably destructive manner, “on a 
planetary scale, that is, in the spirit of technology [Geiste der Technik].”59 
For Klages, “technology is without the slightest capacity to enrich life,” capable only of 
contributing to what he, in another context, calls a “poverty of experience” that can only be 
counteracted when the poet’s genius of language transports the soul “with almost 
supernatural magic [dämonischer Zauberkraft] …into a whirl of superhuman [mehr als 
menschlichen] experience” (SC 70). Yet “there is no more insipid and shabby antithesis,” 
objects Benjamin in The Arcades Project, “than that which reactionary thinkers like Klages 
try to set up between the symbol-space of nature and that of technology” (AP K1a, 3). 
Benjamin, in contrast, envisions the positive possibility of a second, alternative Geist of 
technology and with arrhythmic Takt of industrial production. As Wohlfarth argues, it is the 
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“Marxian dialectic between the forces and relations of production” that for Benjamin opens a 
“one-way street out of Klages’s système sans issue.”60 His “version of the ‘doctrine of the 
ancients’ differs point by point from Klages, but it is from Klages’s that it differs” and in 
turning “Klages on his head”, Benjamin ends up producing “a kind of left-wing Klages.”61
Where Klages associates his theory of images with a formative power of humanity, he 
assumes the bodily form of humanity is eternal and therefore biologically complete. The 
decorporatization of humanity can therefore only appear as an acosmic intrusion, which 
Klages identifies with Geist. Benjamin, in contrast, rejects Klages’s antithesis between 
natural Seele and rational Geist, retaining a commitment to a dialectics of Geist, and instead 
introduce a distinction between two kinds of body, first differentiated in the Klagesean-
infused ‘Outline of the Psychophysical Problem’ (1922) as the solitariness pertaining to the 
corporeal body [Körper] versus the collectivity of the lived body [Leib]:
In additional to the totality of all its living members, humanity is able partly to 
draw nature, the nonliving, plant, and animals into this life of the body [Leib] of 
humankind, and thereby into this annihilation and fulfilment. It can do this by 
virtue of the technology in which the unity of its life is formed. Ultimately 
everything that subserves humanity’s happiness may be counted part of its life, its 
limbs. (SW1 395)
Klages’s formative power is extended to include all the social and technological 
transformations of bodily vitality and expression, which entail the destruction of its current 
form (the completion of the bodily form of human individuals) as it undergoes a new, 
collective reformation. The “anguish of nature which can no longer be contained in life and 
flows out in wild currents over the body” is both the manifestation of “the utter decay of 
corporeality” but simultaneously “the last instrument of its renewal” (SW1 396). This 
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becomes associated with the consummation of new historical forms of collective bodily 
experience (and, elsewhere, associated not with the more-than-human individualism of 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch but the impoverished experience of the less-than-human 
Unmensch), as the precursor for an alternative configuration of the relationship between 
humanity, technology and nature.62 
This narrative is taken up in ‘To the Planetarium,’ where Benjamin proclaims that, 
“Humans [Menschen] as a species completed their development thousands of years ago; but 
humanity [Menschheit] as a species is just beginning its development” (SW1 487). The 
transformation of humanity’s collective bodily nature or physis entails a new and different 
contact with the cosmos, in which “the frame of mankind” – its “new body [neuen Leib]” – is 
“shaken by a feeling that resembled the bliss of the epileptic” during the “frenzy of 
destruction” which occurred during First World War’s “nights of annihilation” (SW1 487). 
This implies a more dialectical and historical relationship between what Klages distinguishes 
as Seele and Geist, in line with Eisenstein’s own critical response to Klages. 
In contrast to the conception of Geist as an ahistorical intrusion, fundamentally alien 
to the body, and the overidentification of collective psychosomatic images with the natural 
Seele, Benjamin’s critical revisions suggest both the problematic aspects of any Seele tied to 
the organic limitations of the individual Körper and also how the emergence of a new, 
collective Leib might be correspond to a technological Geist accompanied by its own vital 
images. As Wohlfarth has argued, just as ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ postulated the persistence 
of an archaic physiological faculty to seize resemblances that is not simply annihilated but 
archived within the language, so ‘To the Planetarium’ gambles on the belief that “Collective, 
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ecstatic union with the cosmos has not forfeited its claims upon humanity but …will find its 
modern consummation in an unleashed technology.”63 
The introduction of a collective-bodily Geist permits Benjamin to differentiate 
between a first (annihilatory, negative, acosmic) and second (formative, positive, cosmic) 
technology. The “first attempt of humankind ...to conquer the uncontrolled destructive 
spasms of this new technological body with the disciplining power of living substance 
[Lebendiges]” is described as “a Rausch of generation” [Rausche der Zeugung]’ (SW 1:487). 
Indeed, as the earlier discussion of Bekhterev, Eisenstein, Tretyakov and Lacis sought to 
demonstrate, this potential resides in the mimetic infectious of the movement – the expressive 
language – of cinema itself: montage. If, as Benjamin suggests, Epic Theatre’s “discovery 
and construction of the gestic is nothing but a retranslation of the methods of montage – so 
crucial in radio and film – from a technological process to a human one” (SW2 584), we 
might equally add that the construction of montage in cinema was itself conceived as the 
translation of expressive gestures of bodily language from the media of the human body to 
that of technology.  
The section ‘Prayerwheel,’ for example, begins to develop an alternative concept of the 
utopian will, connecting the motive innervations of the will to the vitality of images:
Only the presented image [vorgestellte Bild] vitally nourishes the will. 
Conversely, the mere word can at most ignite it, but then, shrivelled up, it 
smoulders. No undamaged will without exact imagistic presentation [genaue 
bildliche Vorstellung]. No presentation without innervation [Keine Vorstellung 
ohne Innervation]. (SW 1:466, trans. altered)
Benjamin’s Schopenhauerian reference to the relation between Wille and Vorstellung, which 
extends to the invocation of the Buddhist practice of breathing in accordance with the holy 
63
 Wohlfarth, “Walter Benjamin and the Idea of a Technological Eros,” 78-9.
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symbol as a model for such regulation of bodily innervations and therefore the activation of 
images, reflects the fact that Klages took Schopenhauer’s “immediate relationship” between 
Wille and Leib “and developed it into his [own] ‘theory of expressions’.”64 Although 
Benjamin’s discussion of breathing practices recalls the pranayama (the ayama, extension or 
expansion, of the prana, the vital life-energy/breathe, one of the five principles of Yoga) and 
in particular of the chanting of the sacred syllable “om”, the title ‘Prayer Wheel’ refers to 
writing of the Sanskrit symbols of the mantra, Om mani padme hum, upon and inside a 
spinning wheel powered by hand, wind, heat, water or sometimes electricity, and therefore 
used as a technological aid for bodily visualization.
Just as the ‘Prayer Wheel’ balances the power of the imagistic presentation against the 
vitality of bodily movement, so the ‘Program’ describes the playful gestures of the learning 
child in terms of an exactly proportioned equilibrium between the “receptive innervation” 
associated with the perceptual stimulus of the child’s vision and the “creative innervation” 
associated with the motor movements of the child’s hand (SW2 203). “The developing of 
these gestures into various forms of expression,” Benjamin adds, is achieved through the 
“improvised synthesis” of the theatrical performance in which, in an echo of Marx’s famous 
proclamation in the third of his theses On Feuerbach, “children stand on stage and teach and 
educate their attentive educators.” In both instances, a concordant turn away from the 
consciousness of the present opens up new practical possibilities, a meditative expansion of 
the playing space [Spielraum] that is still invoked in the theses ‘On the Concept of History’ 
that Benjamin compares with the “themes which monastic discipline assigned to friars for 
meditation” (SW4 393): both are intended to turn us away from our conscious concern with 
worldly affairs, that encourage a linear conception of historical progress and centrist concern 
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with popular politics, neither of which he deemed capable of confronting the powers invoked 
by fascism. 
Misreading Freud: the Remembrance of the Dead
When Benjamin speaks of a ‘Different Utopian Will’ in the notes associated with his earlier 
formulations of the ‘Work of Art’ essay (and repeated in the discussion of innervation in the 
Arcades Project), it is once again the signals of the learning child that provide the model for 
such revolutionary innervations and, specifically, the rhythmic gesture of grasping: “Just as a 
child who has learned to grasp stretches out its hand for the moon as it would for a ball, so 
humanity, in its efforts at innervation, sets its sights as much on currently utopian goals as on 
goals within reach” (SW3 135; cf. also SW3 124, n10 & AP W7, 4). As with the ‘Program’, 
receptive innervation is exemplified in the attractive stimulus of the developing child 
(associated with the impression of the moon) and creative innervation in the motor 
movements of the child’s hand (associated with the reflex of grasping). The action of 
grasping, one of the primary reflexes of human infants, serves as the example of an 
expressive movement in Eisenstein’s biomechanics and Benjamin’s figure of the child 
reaching for the moon constitutes a cosmic model of expressive movement: the rhythmic 
completion of a reflex, rather than the conscious and intentional relaxation of muscular 
innervations that occurs when the adult calculates that the moon is not within reach. 
The mediating element of this figure, it should be emphasized, is not the 
consciousness of the moon itself but the actualized (that is, attractive or affective) image of 
the ball. Consequently, the ball-moon montage functions as a primal image, innervated in 
relation to the formative drive of the child. Despite its romantic connotations, the natural 
imagery of the distant moon is brought nearer by Benjamin through the cultural-technological 
artefact of the toy ball, whilst conversely the toy ball is made an object of yearning in 
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conjunction with the natural-mythological force of the moon. In the earlier versions of the 
‘Work of Art’ essay, therefore, the dialectical account of the innervating body-space of 
technological Geist is brought back into conjunction with the image-space Klages had 
reserved solely for the natural creativity of the Seele. Here, affective image-space is rendered 
dialectical in a similar way to body-space, with the positive function of technologically 
innervating rhythms of Takt being connected to the dissipation of the negative and 
individualized dimension of what Benjamin understands as ‘auratic’ perception.65  
Both Miriam Hansen and Mark Hansen claim that this theory of images disappears in 
Benjamin’s last essays (the final version of the ‘Work of Art’ essay and ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’), representing an eschewal of the “cognitive” dimension of his politics of 
innervation. For Mark Hansen, Benjamin’s account of innervation in ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’ is a “purely physiological, sensuous, and (in the broad sense) aesthetic response 
65
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to mechanical stimuli” that “can no longer make common cause with his earlier dialectical 
and image-centred conception.”66 With the jettisoning of this ‘cognitive’ element of the 
earlier theory, he argues, Benjamin simultaneously abandons the politically redemptive 
promise earlier associated with technology, and the “surrealist inspired program of dialectical 
awakening,” giving way to a more minimal concern: “how is humanity to establish and 
maintain (nondestructive) contact with the ever complexifying, technologically driven 
cosmos?” Miriam Hansen similarly argues that the anthropological-materialist elaboration of 
mimetic innervations elaborated in the second version of the ‘Work of Art’ essay 
(specifically in the longer sixth section of the second version and its associated footnote) is 
dropped from the final version. As a consequence, she objects, the concept of politicizing that 
ends the later version is too easily conflated with the “liquidationist tenor” and “politically 
progressive purchase” of a “romantic notion of proletarian culture” (CE 83 & 91), giving rise 
to what we might characterize as a liquidationist, left-Fordist or accelerationist politics.67 
Significantly, Mark Hansen identifies this essay’s focus on the experience of 
technological shock – for the poet in the crowd or the worker at the industrial machine, 
“innervations flow through him in rapid succession, like the energy from a battery” (SW4 
328; trans. modified) – with Benjamin’s “strong misreading” of Freud.68 This misreading 
hinges, however, on a series of conceptual manoeuvres that work to reintroduce significant 
motifs from Klages’s theory of the actuality of images, despite the explicit disavowal of 
Klages in the opening section for “making common cause with fascism” (SW4 314). 
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First, the Bergsonian appeal to a vita contemplativa and a vita activa is undermined 
by Benjamin’s subsequent construction of “genuine historical experience” that, in contrast to 
Bergson’s durée and action, “gleans what earlier generations admired” and so includes an 
appeal to the dead (and, as such, the death of contemplation and action) (SW4 352, n63); the 
Proustian distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory associated with the vita 
contemplativa is similarly blurred through a concept of remembrance [Eingedenken] 
ultimately associated with the cultic quality of the image (“probably nowhere recalled in 
Proust’s work” (SW4 316), Benjamin unhelpfully adds); finally, this cultic fusion of 
individual and collective history and prehistory involves a distinction between recollection 
[Erinnerung] and memory [Gedächtnis] absent from Freud’s work. Benjamin’s remarks “are 
not intended to confirm” Freud’s essay; he admits that “there is no substantial difference 
between the concepts Erinnerung and Gedächtnis as used in Freud’s essay” in order to 
explain Freud’s problematic claim that “consciousness takes the place of a trace of 
recollection [Erinnerungsspur]” (SW4 345, n16; translation altered). 
While he makes reference to Theodor Reik’s Surprise and the Psycho-Analyst (1935) 
to justify the mnemonic distinction between Erinnerung and Gedächtnis absent from Freud’s 
essay, this distinction would have been more familiar to Benjamin from Klages’s argument 
that “we could never reach a clear understanding of said memory [Gedächtnis] unless we 
begin by making a distinction, foreign to current speech, between memory [Gedächtnis] and 
capacity for recollection [Erinnerung]” (SC 94). For Klages, the former is a “vital fact,” 
which does not require contemplation, sensation or consciousness but exists as a “hereditary 
memory” in which “the impression of grains [for chicks], or of the breast [for human babies], 
is accompanied by an experience of a certain significance” (SC 97). This “must by no means 
be confused with the capacity for recollection,” which merely represents one of the 
consequences of this function “under certain and new conditions” (SC 94). The images of 
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memory pertain to the “vanished immemorial past” such that “primordial images are 
appearing souls of the past [erscheinende Vergangenheitsseelen]” (SC 94). Without 
referencing Klages, Benjamin invokes these “images of an earlier world” [Bild der Vorwelt] 
in his invocation of Baudelaire’s correspondences as “the data of Eingedenken – not 
historical data, but data of prehistory ...an encounter with earlier life” (SW 4:334). 
In Benjamin’s ‘Baudelaire’ essay, the theory of innervations becomes coded more 
directly as the Chockerlebnis of present technological and urban experience, which 
increasingly intrude upon and threaten this collective mnemonic dimension; a historically 
elongated conception of historical time implicitly elaborated, as Michael Jennings has pointed 
out, via Klages’s and Jung’s interpretation of the phantasmagoria as collective psychology.69 
Here, then, the innervating shocks of industrial modernity, earlier identified with Takt, are 
discharged into the prehistorical mnemonic depths of the image-making medium itself, 
corresponding to a form of motoric-ideo mimesis that specifically contradicts the description 
of anticathexis proffered by Freud, who has no corresponding account of Gedächtnis and 
maintains that such shocks divulge upon the outer layer of perceptual consciousness. 
Conclusion
Benjamin’s account of technological innervations draws attention to the psychosomatic 
economy of energetics developed from vitalism but given a left-wing orientation in the works 
of Eisenstein. The interpenetration of image and body space involves, on this account, not 
merely the bodily dimension of affectively charged images (within the organic human body) 
69
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but also the imagistic dimension of technological innervations (in connection with the 
extended body of humanity): the prehistorical as well as historical aspect of the energy 
dissipated in and through technology. We might think here not merely of the history of 
human labour incorporated into technology through both material and affective production 
but also a prehistory of such labour that flows back to the fossilized organic remains that still 
provide the dominant (non-renewable) source of energy for our technology today.
The historically redemptive escape from Klages’s mythological annihilation is 
modelled not on theology or art itself but a capacity to discipline the innervating power of 
technology through affective images which simultaneously give expression to the new forms 
of collective body life. The dialectically redemptive alternative to the destructive Geist of 
Technik involves the mediation of an eros-infused interplay between man and nature, in 
contrast to the sexual violence deplored in Klages’s Mensch und Erde. In the second version 
of ‘The Work of Art’ essay from the mid-1930s, currently existing first technology is said to 
aim at a mastery over nature, through the maximal possible utilization of humans, whereas a 
utopian second technology experimentally and playfully aims not at domination but a 
nonviolent and experimental interplay between nature and humanity. Against the antithesis 
between the Urbilder of nature and the Geist of technology, Benjamin insists that “to each 
truly new configuration of nature – and, at bottom, technology is just such a configuration – 
there corresponds new ‘images”’ (AP, Ka1, 3). 
Miriam Hansen suggests that the archaic dimensions of Klages’s theory of primal 
images permitted Benjamin to recover the possibility of a transgenerational memory, as a 
mode of perception which “imbricates the momentary ‘flashing-up’ of the image with the 
past of cosmic nature... generations of dead; and one’s own forgotten youth” (CE 124-5). But 
the dialectical images opened by the innervations of technological media imply, it should also 
be emphasized, the preconscious of a new Geist of technology: a collective unconscious that 
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is located not in the organic body but the externalization of memory achieved with 
mechanically and digitally reproducible media. To the extent that the function of 
memorization has become increasingly externalized in technological media, which therefore 
harbours the potential of accumulating the energies of our collectively non-conscious desires, 
the minimal role that recollection still retains in contemporary mnemonics serves as a 
conscious substitute to such remembrance: today, individualized representations of feeling – 
the consciousness of memory rather than the affect of remembrance – still largely stand in the 
place of such collective bodily action. 
It remains the task of childhood to discover the new “images” that correspond to each 
new configuration of nature (“and, at bottom, technology is just such a configuration,” 
Benjamin writes, insisting against Klages that there are primal images of the locomotive and 
the automobile as much as the forest and the mountains) and bring these into “symbolic 
space” in order to “incorporate them into the image stock of humanity.” This is, Benjamin 
makes clear, a pedagogical task, recalling the educative function of the children’s 
performances: “To educate the image-making medium within us” (AP N1, 7). What the 
utopian will of the learning child is able to do through the assimilation of such images via its 
utopian gestures, Benjamin seems to be suggesting, is to remember and express the future.
References
Abelson, Peter. 1993. “Schopenhauer and Buddhism.” Philosophy East and West 43, no 2: 255-278. 
Anderson, Perry. 1979. Considerations on Western Marxism. London: Verso.
Aragon, Louis. 1994. Paris Peasant, trans. Simon Watson Taylor. Boston: Exact Change.
Bekhterev, Vladimir M. 1973. “Emotions as Somato-Mimetic Reflexes.” In Feelings and Emotions: 
The Wittenberg Symposium, edited by Martin L. Reymert. New York: Arno Press: 270-283.
37
Bekhterev, Vladimir M. 1994. Collective Reflexology, Part 1, edited by Lloyd H. Strickland. New 
Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
Bekhterev, Vladimir M. 1998. Suggestions and Its Role in Social Life, edited by Lloyd H. Strickland. 
New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Bekhterev, Vladimir M. 2006. “Immortality from the Scientific Point of view.” Society 43, no. 2: 74-
80.
Benjamin, Walter. 1991-1999. Selected Writings. Volumes 1-4, edited by Howard Eiland and Michael 
W. Jennings. Cambridge, MA., & London: Harvard University Press.
Benjamin, Walter. 1994. The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin. 1910-1940, edited by Gershom 
Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Benjamin, Walter. 1999. The Arcades Project, translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. 
Cambridge, MA. & London: Harvard University Press.
Bishop, Paul. 2012. The Archaic: The Past in the Present. London: Routledge.
Block, Richard. 2000. “Selective Affinities: Walter Benjamin and Ludwig Klages.” Arcadia 35: 117–
36.
Bode, Rudolf. 2014. “Rhythm and its Importance for Education.” Body & Society 20, no. 3-4: 51-74.
Breton, André. 1972. “Manifesto of Surrealism (1924).” In Manifestoes of Surrealism, translated 
Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane, 1-48. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buci-Gluckmann, Christine. 1994. Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, translated by 
Patrick Camiller. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
Buck-Morss, Susan. 2001. “Walter Benjamin: Between Academic Fashion and the Avant-Garde.” 
Pandaemonium germanicum, no. 5: 73-88.
Bulgakowa, Oksana. 2001. Sergei Eisenstein: A Biography. Berlin and San Francisco: Potemkin 
Press.
Bulgakowa, Oksana. 2014. “From Expressive movement to the ‘basic problem’: the Vygotsky-Luria-
Eisenstein theory of art.” In The Cambridge Companion to Cultural-Historical Psychology, 
edited by A. Yasnitsky, R. van der Veer,  M. Ferrari, 423-44?. 
38
Byford, Andy. 2016. “V. M. Bekhterev in Russian Child Science, 1900s-1920s:’ ‘Objective 
Psychology’/‘Reflexology’ as a Scientific Movement.” Journal of Behavioural Sciences 52, 
no.2: 99-123.
Carpenter, William B. 1852. “On the influence of Suggestion in Modifying and directing Muscular 
Movement, independently of Volition”. Notes of the Royal Institution of Great Britain: 152-3.
Charles, Matthew. 2012. “Faust on film: Walter Benjamin and the cinematic ontology of Goethe’s 
Faust 2”. Radical Philosophy 172: 18-29.
Charles, Matthew. 2013. “On the conservatism of post-Jungian criticism: competing concepts of the 
symbol in Freud, Jung and Walter Benjamin.” International Journal of Jungian Studies 5, no. 
2: 120-139.
Charles, Matthew. 2018. “Pedagogy as ‘Cryptic Politics’”: Benjamin, Nietzsche and the End of 
Education,’ boundary 2 (forthcoming).
Cohen, Margaret. 1995. Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of Surrealist 
Revolution. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
Cowan, Michael. 2007. “The Heart Machine: ‘Rhythm’ and Body in Weimar Film and Fritz Lang’s 
Metropolis.” MODERNISM / modernity 14, no. 2: 225-248.
Dahme, Heinz-Jürgen . 1990. “On the Current Rediscovery of Georg Simmel’s Sociology – A 
European Point of View.” In Georg Simmel and Contemporary Sociology, edited by M. Kaern, 
B.S. Phillips, Robert S. Cohen, 13-37. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Davidson, Neil. 2009. “Walter Benjamin and the classical Marxist tradition.” International Socialism, 
no. 121. http://isj.org.uk/walter-benjamin-and-the-classical-marxist-tradition/
Eiland, Howard and Michael W. Jennings. 2014. Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life. Cambridge, MA., 
and London: Harvard University Press.
Eisenstein, Sergei and Sergei Tretyakov. 1996. “Expressive Movement.” In Meyerhold, Eisenstein 
and Biomechanics: Actor Training in Revolutionary Russia, edited by Alma Law and Mel 
Gordon, 173-192. London: McFarland.
39
Eisenstein, Sergei. 2010. “The Montage of Attractions.” In Selected Works. Volume 1: Writings 1922-
34, edited and translated by Richard Taylor, 33-38. London & New York: I. B. Tauris & 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Eisenstein, Sergei. 2010. “The Montage of Film Attractions.” In Selected Works. Volume 1: Writings 
1922-34, edited and translated by Richard Taylor, 39-58. London & New York: I. B. Tauris and 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Eisenstein, Sergei. 1963. “A Dialectic Approach to Film Form.” In Film Form: Essays in Film 
Theory, edited by Jay Leyda, 45-63. London: Dennis Dobson.
Engels, Friedrich. 1940. Dialectics of Nature. New York: International Publishers.
Foster, Hal. 2003. Design and Crime: And Other Diatribes. London: Verso.
Foster, Hal. 2004. Prosthetic Gods. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
Freud, Sigmund. 1995. “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (I).” In The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by James Strachey, Vol. 3, 45-61. 
London: The Hogarth Press. 
Freud, Sigmund. 1958. “Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia 
(Dementia Paranoids).” In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, edited by James Strachey, Vol. 12, 9-84. London: The Hogarth Press.
Frisby, David. 1984. Georg Simmel. London and New York: Routledge.
Frisby, David. 1985. Fragments of Modernity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Frisby, David. 2013. Sociological Impressionism: A Reassessment of Georg Simmel’s Social Theory. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
Fuld, Werner. 1981. “Walter Benjamins Beziehung zu Ludwig Klages.” Akzente 28, no. 3: 274-287.
Haakenson, Thomas O. 2009. “‘The Merely Illusory Paradise of Habits’: Salomo Friedlander, Walter 
Benjamin, and the Grotesque.” New German Critique, no. 106: 119-147.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. “Georg Simmel on Philosophy and Culture: Postscript to a Collection of 
Essays,” Critical Inquiry 22, no.3: 403-414.
40
Hamacher, Werner. 2002. “Guilt History: Benjamin’s Sketch ‘Capitalism as Religion’.” Diacritics 32, 
no. 3–4: 81–106.
Hansen, Mark. 2000. Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan.
Hansen, Miriam Bratu. 1999. “Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street.” Critical Inquiry 25, 
no.2: 306-343.
Hansen, Miriam Bratu. 2008. “Benjamin’s Aura.” Critical Inquiry 34: 336-375.
Hansen, Miriam Bratu. 2012. Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin and 
Theodor W. Adorno. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
Ingram, Susan. 2002. “The Writing of Asja Lacis.” New German Critique, no. 86: 159-177.
Jay, Martin. 1984. Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
Jennings, Michael. 2003. “On the Banks of a New Lethe: Commodification and Experience in 
Benjamin’s Baudelaire Book.” Boundary 2 30, no.1:89-104.
Koepnick, Lutz Peter. 1999. Walter Benjamin and the Aesthetics of Power. Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press.
Klages, Ludwig. 1926. Mensch und Erde. Jena: Eugen Diederichs.
Klages, Ludwig. 1929. The Science of Character, translated by Walter Henry Johnston. London: 
George Allen & Unwin.
Klages, Ludwig. 1937. Foreword to Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele. Zweite Auflage, Band 1. 
Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.
Klages, Ludwig. 1963. Vom Kosmogonischen Eros. Bonn: H. Bouvier.
Klages, Ludwig. 1974. “Vom Traumbewusstsein.” In Sämtliche Werke, Band 1. Bonn: H. Bouvier.
Klages, Ludwig. 1981. Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele. 6. Ungekürzte Auflage. Bonn: Bouvier 
Verlag Herbert Grundmann.
Lacis, Asja. 1973. “A Memoir.” Performance 1.5: 24-27.
Lacis, Asja. 1984. Krasnaya Gvozdika. Riga: Liecma. 
41
Lacis, Asja. 1971. Revolutionär im Beruf, Bericht eüber proletarisches Theater, über Meyerhold, 
Brecht, Benjamin und Piscator, edited by Hildegard Brenner. Munich: Rogner & Bernhard.
Law, Alex & Jan Law. 2002. “Magical Urbanism: Walter Benjamin and Utopian Realism in the film 
Ratcatcher.” Historical Materialism 10, no. 4: 173 – 211.
Law, Alma and Mel Gordon, eds. 1996. Meyerhold, Eisenstein and Biomechanics: Actor Training in 
Revolutionary Russia. London, McFarland.
Leach, Neil. 2005. “Mimesis.” Architectural Theory Review 10, no. 1: 93-104.
Leach, Robert. 1994. Revolutionary Theatre. London: Routledge.
Lebovic, Nitzan. 2006. “The Beauty and Terror of Lebensphilosophie: Ludwig Klages, Walter 
Benjamin, and Alfred Baeumler.” South Central Review 23, no. 1: 23-39..
Lebovic, Nitzan. 2013. The Philosophy of Life and Death: Ludwig Klages and the Rise of Nazi 
Biopolitics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Leslie, Esther. 2000. Overpowering Conformism. London: Pluto.
McCole, John Joseph. 1993. Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition. Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press.
McGill, Justine. 2008. “The Porous Coupling of Walter Benjamin and Asja Lacis.” Angelaki 13, no. 
2: 59-72.    
Noys, Benjamin. 2011. “‘Grey in Grey’: Crisis, Critique, Change.” Journal of Critical Globalisation 
Studies 4: 46-60.
Noys, Benjamin . 2014. Malign Velocities: Accelerationism and Capitalism. Winchester: Zero Books.
Rabinbach, Anson. 1979. “Introduction to Walter Benjamin’s ‘Doctrine of the Similar’.” New 
German Critique, no. 17: 60-64.
Roff, Sarah Ley. 2004. “Benjamin and Psychoanalysis.” In The Cambridge Companion to Walter 
Benjamin, edited by David S. Ferris, 115-133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schnädelbach, Herbert. 1984. Philosophy in Germany. 1831-1933, translated by Eric Matthews. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42
Scholem, Gershom. 19821. Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship, translated by Harry Zohn. 
New York: New York Review Books.
Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1987. Ein Lebendsbild in Briefen, edited by Angelika Hubscher. Frankfurt: 
Insel Verlag.
Simmel, Georg. 2004. The Philosophy of Money, edited by David Frisby. London: Routledge. 
Steiner, Uwe. 2001. “The True Politician: Walter Benjamin's Concept of the Political.” New German 
Critique, no. 83: 43-88.
Stoessel, Marleen. 1983. Aura: Das Vergessene Menschliche: Zu Sprache und Erfahrung bei Walter 
Benjamin. Munich: Carl Hanser.
Toepfer, Karl. 1997. Empire of Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement in German Body Culture, 1910–1935.  
Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press.
Weigel, Sigrid. 1997. Body- and Image-Space. London and New York: Routledge.
Micko, Marian. 2010. Walter Benjamin und Georg Simmel. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Wohlfarth, Irving, 2002. “Walter Benjamin and the Idea of a Technological Eros. A tentative reading 
of Zum Planetarium.” Benjamin Studies/Studien 1: 67-109.
Wolin, Richard. 1994. Walter Benjamin: an Aesthetic of Redemption. Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press.
Wolin, Richard. 1995. Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas. Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press.
Wolin, Richard. 2008. “Walter Benjamin Meets the Cosmics: A Forgotten Weimar Moment.” 
Keynote address at the conference The Weimar Moment: Liberalism, Political Theology and 
Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison, http://www.law.wisc.edu/m/ndkzz/wolin_revised_10-
13_benjamin_meets_the_cosmics.doc.
